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STATISTICAL  COMPARISON  OF  ^JNIVi:i<SAL  AND 
VOLUNTARY  MILITARY  SERVICE 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION.  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS    A    SUPPLEMENT    TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF    A    PROPER    MILITARY 

POLICY   FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 


WCD  4886-25 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER,    1915 


581 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1916 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  531. 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff. 


SYNOPSIS 


Page. 

Analysis  of  Table  I 6 

Analysis  of  Table  II 6 

General  comments •  8 

30668'— No.  631—15  (3) 


6G7338 


STATISTICAL  COMPARISON  OF  UNIVERSAL  AND 
VOLUNTARY  MILITARY  SERVICE. 


The  leading  European  powers,  and  Japan,  are  organized  for  in- 
dustrial competition  in  peace  and  for  full  preparedness  against  war. 
England  and  the  United  States  are  not  so  organized. 

The  principal  "  tool "  used  by  the  European  nations  and  by  Japan 
in  such  organization,  has  been  universal  military  service,  an  institu- 
tion extending  back  into  the  last  century,  adopted  and  made  compul- 
sory by  vote  of  their  peoples;  and  with  time  so  adjusted,  developed, 
and  corrected  as  to  coordinate  with  the  industrial,  commercial,  and 
financial  life  of  the  nation,  and  make  the  transition  from  peace  to 
war  conditions  least  disturbing  to  the  nation. 

By  means  of  this  tool,  we  find,  early  in  1914,  that  the  war  man 
power  of  the  universal  service  nations  is  limited  by  their  respective 
financial  conditions,  by  the  material  which  is  disposable  for  war,  and 
by  the  numbers  of  able-bodied  male  citizens  who  can  be  taken  from 
those  interior  industries  and  vocations  that  are  essential  to  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  national  life  and  to  the  prosecution  of  war;  and  we 
find  further  that  some  of  those  nations  can  place  in  the  field  one- 
tenth  of  their  total  population,  organized,  armed,  and  equipped, 
trained  and  physically  fit  for  actual  fighting. 

On  the  other  hand  we  find,  at  this  time,  the  two  English-speaking 
nations  whose  geographical  situation,  populations,  and  resources 
place  them  in  the  front  rank  of  w^orld  powers,  pursuing  parallel 
policies  in  avoiding  any  semblance  of  military  strength  on  land, 
seeking  rather  to  confine  their  preparedness  to  power  on  the  sea ; 
and  hoping  when  atacked  to  find  defense  on  land  through  volun- 
teers, supplemented  in  great  stress  by  conscripts. 

The  world  military  situation  existing  to-day  and  created  by  uni- 
versal service,  by  which  the  principal  European  nations  and  Japan 
are  able  to  place  the  trained  masses  of  their  peoples  in  the  fighting 
fronts,  is  om.inous,  and  it  makes  pertinent  a  comparison  of  the  uni- 
versal and  voluntary  service  sj^stems.  "With  the  object  of  giving  a 
concise  statistical  view  of  the  situation,  the  accompanying  tables  have 
been  prepared,  based  upon  data  found  in  the  "  Statesman's  Year 
Book,  1915,"  most  of  the  items  pertaining  to  conditions  existing  prior 
to  the  present  European  war. 

(5) 

681 


ANALYSIS  OF  TABLE  L 

While  some  of  the  universal  service  nations  hold  their  young  men 
to  liahiUty  for  service  prior  to  the  age  of  20  years,  and  their  older 
men  after  the  age  of  38  years,  they  do  not,  as  a  rule,  enroll  men  for 
training  before  the  twentieth  nor  after  the  thirty-eighth  year.  This 
may  be  explained  by  the  fact  of  many  immature  youths  of  less  than 
20,  and  to  marked  depreciation  in  fitness  after  38. 

Generally,  therefore,  w^e  find  that  training,  and  actual  service  as 
soldiers,  begins  at  the  age  of  20  and  extends  through  three  periods 
of  relative  fitness,  with  average  about  as  f ollow^s : 

{a)  A  first  line  period,  consisting  of  two  or  three  years  of  inten- 
sive training,  followed  by  seven  or  eight  years  of  first  reserve  service, 
the  latter  with  some  training.  During  this  period,  physical  fitness 
is  considered  at  the  maximum,  i.  e.,  from  20  to  30  years. 

(&)  A  second  line  period,  consisting  of  about  10  years  of  second 
reserve  service,  with  short  periods  of  supplementary  training,  gener- 
ally at  maneuvers. 

(c)  A  home  defense  or  auxiliary  service  period,  generally  without 
any  training,  for  men  betwen  40  and  45  years. 

Included  in  this  table  will  be  found  corresponding  figures  pertain- 
ing to  Australia  and  Switzerland,  States  which  have  adopted  limited 
compulsory  service  for  home  defense  only,  the  results  of  which  have 
not  been  tested  by  war.  It  must  be  admitted  that  the  systems  of  these 
two  States  are  of  doubtful  utility  to  a  world  power  facing  the  ques- 
tion of  adequate  preparedness  in  all  its  phases. 

ANALYSIS  OF  TABLE  IL 

That  the  figures  in  this  table  may  be  understood,  it  must  be  borne 
in  mind  that  not  only  do  financial,  industrial,  and  economic  condi- 
tions, varying  in  the  different  nations,  seriously  affect  the  cost  of 
military  efficiency,  but  also  that  in  some  nations  utilities  owned  by 
the  Government  are  made  use  of  in  military  training  without  corre- 
sponding charge  against  the  military  budget. 

It  must  be  evident  that  under  equal  financial  and  industrial  condi- 
tions, mobilization  for  training  will  cost  more  in  an  extensive  coun- 
try like  Russia  than  in  a  compact  country  like  Italy  or  Japan. 

And,  further,  it  is  admitted  that  a  comparative  analysis  may  be 
misleading,  but  not  vitally  so,  for  the  reason  that  we  can  not  ascer- 
tain what  proportion  of  the  budgets  is  expended  for  training  proper 
and  what  proportion  is  spent  for  armament,  munitions,  and  other 
utilities  necessary  for  the  prevention  or  the  prosecution  of  war. 

With  reference  to  man  power,  it  appears  that  the  total  number  of 
males  of  military  age  in  a  nation  fit  for  service  is  about  one-sixth  of 
the  total  population.     All,  however,  are  not  equally  fit  for  service 

631 


in  the  fighting  line,  and  a  large  proportion  could  be  used  only  for 
service  of  tlie  interior.  In  addition  many  exemptions  must  be  made, 
owing  to  tlie  inadvisability  of  withdrawing  men  from  those  indus- 
tries and  vocations  that  are  essential  to  the  life  of  the  nation,  and 
that  proceed  in  many  cases  with  acceleration  during  war. 

For  tliese  and  other  reasons  the  proportion  of  one-sixth  that  are 
fit  for  service  dwindles  to  about  one-tenth,  and  this  is  the  proportion 
that  experience  shows  as  representing  the  maximum  man  power 
which  any  nation,  however  farsighted  or  methodical  its  statesmen, 
has  been  able  to  place  in  the  fighting  fronts  or  actual  operations  at 
the  outbreak  of  war. 

In  attempting  to  prepare  a  trustworthy  comparative  estimate  of 
the  actual  man  power  of  the  principal  nations  in  terms  of  men  fully 
trained,  organized,  armed,  equipped,  and  fit  for  actual  fighting  it 
has  been  found  that  most  nations  hold  secret  much  of  the  information 
required.  Therefore  estimates  must  rest  upon  a  comparison  of  vari- 
ous factors  that  are  known,  the  principal  ones  being  as  follows: 

(a)  The  extent  and  effectiveness  of  the  peace  training  system  and 
the  length  of  time  the  system  has  been  in  operation : 

In  a  nation  where  a  thorough  system  of  universal  training  has 
been  long  established,  where  the  extent  and  effectiveness  of  training 
is  properly  coordinated  with  financial  conditions,  and  w^here  the 
training  system  has  through  experience  been  so  corrected  and  ad- 
justed that  it  minimizes  interference  with,  while  taking  full  advan- 
tage of,  industrial,  educational,  and  other  features  essential  to  the 
national  life,  we  are  justified  in  the  conclusion  that  a  full  maximum 
of  man  power  can  be  developed. 

On  the  other  hand,  a  nation  that  stints  or  maladministers  its 
training  system,  or  that  has  not  long  applied  such  a  system,  must  suf- 
fer a  material  reduction  in  a  comparative  statement  of  its  trained 
man  power. 

(h)  Limitations  of  organization,  armament,  equipment,  and  mobil- 
ization. These  essentials  to  preparedness  can  not,  like  mushrooms, 
spring  up  during  the  night.  A  nation  with  an  available  man  power 
of  ten  millions,  but  which  limits  the  total  of  its  organizations  ready 
for  war  to  but  one-half  of  that  number,  must  be  estimated  as  having 
but  five  millions  of  man  power. 

Similarly,  reductions  must  be  made  to  correspond  to  what  a  na- 
tion actually  has  in  armament,  munitions,  and  equipment. 

And  if  details  of  mobilization  are  not  worked  out  by  peace  prac- 
tice, defective  results  will  be  expected  in  the  placing  of  men  and 
materials  at  the  fighting  fronts  at  the  outbreak  of  war.  There  will 
then  be  a  corresponding  decrease  in  the  effective  man  power. 

(c)  Proportionate  exemption  of  those  that  are  unfit,  unworthy, 
or  of  those  that  are  fit,  but  can  not  be  spared  from  the  industries  or 

531 


8 

vocations  essential  to  national  life  and  to  the  prosecution  of  war. 
And  to  this  must  be  added  the  elimination  of  those  no  longer  fit  for 
actual  fighting.  These  exemptions  and  eliminations,  with  a  nation 
aiming  at  the  development  of  its  maximum  man  power,  result  in  a 
man  power  of  not  more  than  one-tentli  of  the  total  population.  If 
the  essential  conditions  are  not  fully  organized,  a  further  reduction 
of  man  power  will  result. 

(d)  Relative  financial  and  economic  conditions  of  nations. 

The  development  of  efi'ective  man  power  for  war  is  inseparably 
connected  with  these  features.  Where  these  features  are  defective, 
or  where  the  peace  training  system  does  not  interweave  therewith, 
there  will  result  strains  and  limitations,  with  corresponding  reduc- 
tions of  man  power. 

(e)  Psychological  fitness  of  the  people  of  a  nation  for  war. 

A  nation  which  for  generations  has  directed  all  its  energies  to 
commercialism  will  be  found  peopled  with  those  whose  mental  at- 
tributes unfit  them  for  effective  collective  action  in  war ;  and  such  a 
nation  can  not  for  a  considerable  period  develop  for  war  an  effective 
peace-trained  man  power.  On  the  other  hand,  a  nation  that  has 
directed  its  energies  toward  military  efficiency  will  be  found  with 
people  mentally  equipped  for  and  capable  of  united  action  in  war; 
and  such  a  nation  develops  readily  a  full  man  power  by  its  peace 
training. 

It  will  be  noted  that  the  yearly  cost  per  effective  of  man  power 
is  very  much  less  in  those  nations  that  have  universal  service.  This 
is  but  the  natural  result  of  the  policy  pursued.  The  English- 
speaking  nations  go  into  the  labor  market  in  wage  competition  for 
their  professional  soldiers.  On  the  other  hand,  the  nations  with 
universal  service  coordinate  their  training  with  industrial  and  finan- 
cial conditions;  and  pay  their  men  under  training  a  nominal  sum, 
sufficient  only  for  their  minor  wants  and  for  the  contentment  of  the 
average  man. 

GENERAL  COMMENTS. 

Broadly  speaking,  universal  service,  being  maintained  by  a  tax 
upon  manhood  as  well  as  upon  wealth,  it  distributes  more  reasonably 
the  effort  of  government;  supplementing  the  universal  system  of 
education,  which  it  rounds  out,  it  broadens  and  educates  the  youth 
of  the  nation  individually  and  in  duty  to  the  State,  offsetting  the 
harmful  influences  of  crowded  modern  conditions  of  life,  it  im- 
proves and  builds  up  the  physical  characteristics  of  the  people  of  a 
nation;  and  finally,  when  coordinated  with  other  essential  features 
of  national  life — and  it  is  inseparably  connected  with  them — it 
improves  every   condition   thereof,   and   harmoniously  secures  the 

531 


9 

maximum  of  military  preparedness  now  so  essential  to  the  very 
existence  of  the  modern  nation  in  peace  as  well  as  in  war. 

Although  not  included  in  the  tables  herewith,  it  is  pertinent  in 
connection  with  thought  of  Pan  Americanism,  which  must  now  be 
recognized  as  a  great  fact,  to  state  that  Argentina,  Chile,  and  Brazil, 
which  may  be  considered  as  the  leading  nations  of  South  America, 
have  all  adopted  compulsory  military  service. 

Each  of  these  nations  has  been  divided  into  military  districts  for 
peace  training  and  for  war,  and  each  expends  annually  an  average 
of  10  per  cent  of  its  total  budget,  at  an  average  cost  of  $1  per  in- 
habitant, for  military  preparedness. 

It  is  evident  that  a  nation  first  adopting  universal  service  to  secure 
military  efficiency  will  not  begin  at  once  to  reap  its  benefits.  Sev- 
eral years'  trial,  with  corresponding  years  of  adjustments  and  cor- 
rections to  meet  conditions,  are  necessary,  if  a  nation  would  secure 
the  full  benefits  arising  from  a  well-devised,  well-maintained  pro- 
gram of  uniA'ersal  service. 

Table  I. — Universal  service — Liability  and  enrollment. 


Nation. 


Universal-service  nations: 

Austria-Hungary 

France 

Germany 

Italy 

Japan 

Russia 

Limited  compulsory-service  nations 

Australia 

Switzerland 

Voluntary-ser\ice  nations: 

United  Kinjrdom 

United  States 


531 


Liability. 


19-42 

24 

20-18 

29 

17-45 

29 

20-38 

19 

17-10 

24 

20-43 

24 

19-26 
17-48 


18-45 
18^5 


32 


Actual  enrollment  for  service. 


First 
period. 


Second 
period. 


12 
14 

7 

8 

7§ 
18 


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2J 

2 

2J 

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period. 


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